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Abstract 
Economic policy needs to pay more attention to environmental issues. This calls for the 
development of methodologies capable of incorporating environmental as well as 
macroeconomic goals in the design of public policies. In view of this, this paper 
proposes a methodology based upon Simonian satisficing logic implemented with the 
help of goal programming models to address the joint design of macroeconomic and 
environmental policies. The methodology is applied to the Spanish economy, where a 
joint policy is elicited, taking into account macroeconomic goals (economic growth, 
inflation, unemployment, public deficit) and environmental goals (CO2, NOx and SOx 
emissions) within the context of a computable general equilibrium model. 
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  The standard approach in economics for modelling the optimal design of 
economic policy is to assume that a social planner aims at maximizing some social 
welfare function, typically a representative consumer’s utility function (see Ramsey 
(1927) for a pioneering work). This conventional approach is also often applied to model 
environmental policy, which is typically envisioned as the correction of externalities and 
other market failures in order to achieve maximum economic welfare (see, e.g., Pigou 
(1920) and Coase (1992) for pioneering works, Baumol and Oates (1988) for a classical 
comprehensive text or Xepapadeas (1997) for an up-to-date analysis). 
  A more pragmatic look at the design of economic and environmental policy in 
practice can lead to the conclusion that policy makers do not seek to maximize a single 
welfare function, but are typically concerned with a bundle of economic and 
environmental variables or indicators and try to design their policies to improve the 
performance of the economy as measured by these indicators. In other words, the 
government typically faces a decision-making problem with several policy goals, and  
these goals usually conflict with each other. In purely economic terms, an active anti-
unemployment policy could foster inflation; increasing consumer demand could be 
harmful to the foreign sector, and so on. This is a particularly important point when the 
environment is added as a key concern. Economic objectives are typically opposed to 
environmental objectives, since economic activity requires the exploitation of natural 
resources and generates numerous wastes that have an impact on the environment (see, 
e.g. Meadows, 2004). 
Multicriteria decision making (MCDM) paradigm  was developed specifically to 







techniques, such as multiobjective programming, compromise programming, goal 
programming and others, have been fruitfully applied to many problems in which it is 
unreasonable or impractical to assume the existence of any one criterion that rightly 
defines the preferences of the decision-maker (DM). See Ballestero and Romero (1998) 
for an introduction to multicriteria techniques and their applications to economic 
problems. This type of approach has been applied very extensively to the management of 
the environment and natural resources (see e.g., Romero and Rehman, 1987, Mendoza 
and Martins, 2006).  
In a recent line of research, André and Cardenete (2005, 2006) and André, 
Cardenete and Romero (2007) proposed the use of MCDM techniques to design 
macroeconomic policies. We build on this line of research, extending it to include not 
only economic, but also environmental objectives. In this way we aim to provide a 
broader framework to plan jointly economic and environmental policies.  
The key elements involved in applying this approach are as follows.  First, a 
model or mathematical representation is needed of the economy under analysis, 
including both economic and environmental variables. Our basic methodological 
proposal is a joint representation of economic policy and environmental policy as a 
multicriteria problem. This idea could, in principle, be compatible with any economic 
model representing the decisions of and the interactions among economic agents under 
different policy scenarios. The specific model is not a key feature of the general 
methodological idea and should be selected by the researcher or the policy maker 
according to the goals of each analysis. As explained in section 2, we opted for a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Such models have been widely used for 







al., 2005, O'Ryan et al., 2005 or Böhringer and Löschel, 2006). The model is calibrated 
with 1995 data for the Spanish economy, since the most recent officially available social 
accounting matrix for Spain dates back to this year. 
Second, the policy-making problem must be set up by defining the relevant 
policy objectives and policy instruments. To illustrate our methodological proposal, we 
select some common macroeconomic objectives for application —economic growth, 
inflation, unemployment and public deficit—, and some of the seemingly most 
important environmental objectives, like CO2, SOX and NOX emissions. These elements 
are presented in section 3. Finally, policy-making problems must be tackled by means of 
some suitable multicriteria technique. In section 4 we claim that, in practice, Simonian 
satisficing logic, as opposed to maximizing logic, usually underlies policy-making 
problems (see Simon 1955, 1957). Thus, policy makers do not usually pursue the 
maximization of any policy objective, but they do try to come as close possible to some 
reasonable target levels. This idea is consistent with the multicriteria approach known as 
goal programming (GP). González-Pachón and Romero (2004) establish an axiomatic 
link between GP and the Simonian satisficing logic. In section 4 we formulate a GP 
model that can establish a satisficing economic and environmental policy design. The 
model is applied to the Spanish economy. This produces several suitable policies 
integrating economic and environmental aspects. The main methodological and applied 
conclusions derived from the model are discussed in section 5. 
 
2. THE MODEL AND THE DATABASES 







We use a CGE model following the basic principles of the Walrasian 
equilibrium. See Kehoe et al. (2005) for an up-to-date review. The model is extended by 
including both the public and foreign sectors and explicitly accounting for polluting 
emissions. Taxes and the public sector activity are viewed as exogenous for consumers 
and firms, while they are considered as decision variables for the government. The 
activity level of the foreign sector is assumed to be fixed. The relative prices and the 
activity levels of the productive sectors are endogenous variables. Economic 
equilibrium is given by a price vector for all goods and inputs, a vector of activity 
levels, and a value for public income such that the consumer maximizes his or her 
utility. On the other hand, it is assumed that the productive sectors are maximizing their 
profits (net of taxes), public income equals the payments of all economic agents, and 
supply equals demand in all markets. 
For reasons of space, we discuss only the key elements of the model. A more 
detailed description can be found in the appendix placed at the end of the paper. 
The model comprises 9 productive sectors, after aggregation of Spain’s 1995 
social accounting matrix (SAM). The production technology is given by a nested 
production function. The domestic output of sector j, measured in euros and denoted by 
Xdj, is obtained by combining outputs from the other sectors and the value added VAj 
using a Leontief technology. This value added is generated from primary inputs (labor, 
L, and capital, K), combined using a Cobb-Douglas technology. Overall output of sector 
j, Q j, is obtained from a Cobb-Douglas combination of domestic output and imports 
Xrowj, according to the Armington hypothesis (1969), in which domestic and imported 







The government raises taxes to obtain public revenue, R, (the appendix specifies 
how every tax in the model is computed). Also it gives transfers to the private sector, 
TPS, and demands goods and services from each sector  19 j ,..., = , GDj. PB denotes the 





PB R TPS cpi GD p
=
= ∑ ,       ( 1 )  
cpi being the Consumer Price Index and pj a production price index before value added 
tax (VAT) referring to all goods produced by sector j. Tax revenue includes revenue 
raised from all taxes, including environmental taxes. 
There is only one foreign sector, which comprises the rest of the world. The 
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=− − ∑∑ ,    (2) 
where IMPj denotes imports of sector j, EXPj exports of sector j, TROW transfers from 
abroad for the consumer and rowp is a weighted price index of imported goods and 
services. 
Final demand comes from investment, exports and consumption demand from 
households and the public sector. In our model, there are 9 different goods –
corresponding to productive sectors- and a representative consumer who demands 
present consumer goods and saves the remainder of her disposable income. Consumer 
disposable income (YD) equals labor and capital income, plus transfers, minus direct 
taxes: 







- DT (w L - WC w L) - WC w L,               (3) 
where w and r denote input (labor and capital) prices and L and K input quantities sold 
by the consumer, DT  is the income tax rate and WC  the tax rate corresponding to 
employee Social Security taxes The consumer’s objective is to maximize her welfare, 
subject to her budget constraint. Welfare is obtained from consumer goods CDj (j = 
1,…, 9) and savings SD, according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
YD SD p CD p
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,    (4) 
pinv being an investment price index. 
Regarding investment and saving, this is a savings-driven model. The closure 
rule is defined in such a way that investment, INV , is exogenous, savings are 
determined from the consumer’s decision, and both variables are related to the public 
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=+ + ∑ ,     (5) 
where  pinv is a price index of investment goods. 
Labor and capital demands are computed under the assumption that firms aim to 
maximize profits and minimize the cost of their production. In the capital market we 
consider that supply is perfectly inelastic. In the labor market, it should be stressed 
particularly that there is unemployment (which provides some evidence of labor market 







the model. We take the following approach to labor supply, which shows a feedback 
between the real wage and the unemployment rate, related to the union power or other 







= ,         ( 6 )  
where u and u are the unemployment rates in the simulation and in the benchmark 
equilibrium, respectively, and w/cpi is the real wage. This formulation is consistent with 
an institutional setting where the employers decide the amount of labor demanded and 
workers decide the real wage, taking into account the unemployment rate according to 
equation (6); i.e. if labor demand increases (decreases), the unemployment rate u 
decreases (increases) and workers demand higher (lower) real wages. If, after the 
simulation, employment remains unchanged, the real wage is the same as in the 
benchmark equilibrium. 
2.2 Pollution and environmental taxes 
We focus on emissions obtained from production activities and we adopt a short-
term approach. Therefore, the production technology is assumed to be fixed, as is the 
pollution intensity of all the sectors. Let 
m
j E  denote emissions of pollutant m  (where 
{ } 2,, XX mC O N O S O ∈ ) from activity sector  j  ( 1, ,9 j = … ). Then, we have the 
following equation, which assumes a linear relationship between production  j Q  
(measured in constant euros) and emissions 
mm









j α  measures the amount of emissions of pollutant m  per unit of output 
produced in sector  j . The technical parameter 
m
j α  accounts for the differences in 
pollution intensities across sectors. 
The government imposes an environmental tax of 
m t  euros per emissions unit. 
As a consequence, each sector  j  pays 
m
j T  euros, because of its pollutant emissions m , 
where 
mm m
jj Tt E = ⋅ .        ( 8 )  
Note that because the pollution intensity varies across sectors, the same tax on 
pollution implies a different economic burden with respect to output. Substituting (7) 
into (8), the tax to be paid by sector j can be written as 
mm
jj j TQ =β⋅ ,        ( 9 )  
where 
mm m
jj t β≡ ⋅ α is the marginal and average tax rate for sector  j  in terms of euro 
paid per euro produced, because of its emissions of pollutant m . From the viewpoint of 
industry, the impact of an environmental tax is similar to that of a unit tax on output, 
with the particularity that the tax rate is higher for more polluting industries. The tax 
will drive a wedge between the price paid by consumers and the price received by firms. 
We can expect that the equilibrium (consumer) price will increase and the equilibrium 
quantity will decrease. The tax creates a negative incentive for production (and, hence, 
for pollution), which is particularly strong for more intensively polluting sectors. 
Therefore, we can expect output to decrease more in these sectors. The final impact on 







The total amount of emissions of pollutant m , 
m E , equals the sum of the 








=∑ .        ( 1 0 )  
2.3. Databases and calibration 
The main economic data used in the paper come from the aggregated 1995 social 
accounting matrix (SAM) for Spain. This is the most recent officially available SAM. It 
comprises 21 accounts, including 9 productive sectors, two inputs (labour and capital), a 
saving/investment account, a government account, direct taxes (income tax and payment 
and employees’ Social Security tax) and indirect taxes (VAT, payroll tax, output tax and 
tariffs), a foreign sector and a representative consumer (see Cardenete and Sancho, 
2006, for details). 
The values for the technological coefficients, the tax rates and the utility 
function coefficients are calibrated to reproduce the 1995 SAM as an initial or 
benchmark equilibrium for the economy. In the simulations, the wage is taken as 
numeraire (w = 1), and the other prices vary as required to meet equilibrium conditions. 
To calibrate the 
m
j α  coefficients, we also use sectorial data on the three 




3. POLICY SETTING  
3.1 Policy instruments 
                                                 








  We assume that the policy maker can use the following policy instruments: 
direct and indirect taxes, environmental taxes and public expenditure in each activity 
sector. To make the exercise more lifelike, the direct and indirect tax rates, as well as 
public expenditure by sectors will not be allowed to vary more than 3% with respect to 
the benchmark situation. As regards the environmental taxes, all the tax rates 
m t  will be 
confined to 0 to 3 (from 0 to 3 monetary units per unit of pollutant). These values are 
chosen to represent a reasonable economic burden in terms of output. 
 
3.2 Policy objectives 
  We assume that the government is concerned about two types of policy 
objectives: economic objectives and environmental objectives. 
Economic policy objectives 
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where cpi  is the consumer price index. 
3.- Unemployment rate,  3 f u = . 











= ,       ( 1 3 )  
where  PB is the balance of the public budget ( 0 PB >  means surplus and  0 PB <  
means deficit). 
Environmental policy objectives 
5.- CO2 emissions. For the sake of normalization, the indicator we take is the rate of 
change of CO2 emissions with respect to the observed situation in 1995: 
2










,       ( 1 4 )  
where 
2 CO E  represents emissions after applying the public policy and 
2 CO
bench E  stands for 
the CO2 emissions in the benchmark situation; i.e. the observed value in 1995. 













,       ( 1 5 )  
where 
X NO E represents emissions after applying the public policy and 
X NO
bench E  stands for 
the NOX emissions in the benchmark situation; i.e. the observed value in 1995. 
 





















X SO E  represents emissions after applying the public policy and 
X SO
bench E  stands for 
the SOX emissions in the benchmark situation; i.e. the observed value in 1995. 
 
4. A GOAL PROGRAMMING APPROACH: MODELS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Determining the conflict among objectives 
As is common in MCDM exercises, a useful first step is to determine the degree 
of conflict between the relevant criteria by computing the so-called payoff matrix. This 
is done by optimizing each objective separately and then computing the value of each 
objective at each of the optimal solutions. Table 1 lists the results of these calculations. 
The first row shows the values for each objective when economic growth is maximized. 
The second row shows the same values when inflation is minimized and so on. The 
elements of the main diagonal (in bold characters) display the best attainable value for 
each objective (the highest growth rate, the minimum inflation rate and so on), which, 
taken together, are called the ideal point. The worst element of each column 
(underlined) represents the so-called anti-ideal or nadir point. 
Looking at Table 1, we find that there is a clear conflict between economic and 
environmental criteria, and especially between real growth and pollution reduction. An 
active pro-growth policy could get a real growth of 3.025%, but this would come at the 
cost of increasing CO2 emissions (by 0.408 per cent), SOX emissions (by 0.3851 per 
cent) and NOX emissions (by 0.3833 per cent). On the other hand, CO2, SOX and NOX 
emissions could be reduced by more than 1% with respect to the benchmark situation, 
but this would imply getting a smaller growth rate, of about 2.4 %. There is also some 







level of inflation and a high public deficit. On the other hand, there appear to be no big 
conflicts among the environmental criteria, since the same policies seem to be 
consistent with the reduction of any of the selected pollutants. 
After observing the pay-off matrix, it is quite clear that none of the solutions 
generated by the optimization of any one criterion is acceptable from both the economic 
and the environmental point of view. To get an acceptable policy design, it is absolutely 
necessary to look for best-compromise or satisficing policies between the seven single 
optimum policies shown in Table 1. This task is undertaken in the next section by 
formulating and solving several goal programming (GP) models. 
4.2 Searching for a satisficing joint policy  
  For each of the seven policy objectives, we tentatively set a satisficing target 
level. In this way, the following goals are defined:  
kk kk f npt +−=   { } 1,...,7 k ∈ ,      ( 1 7 )  
where  k n  is the negative deviation variable measuring possible under-achievements and 
k p  is the positive deviation variable measuring possible over-achievement for the k th 
policy goal defined mathematically by  k f . The “more is better” postulate applies to the 
first and fourth policy goals, and therefore the unwanted deviation variable is the 
negative one (i.e.  k n ), whereas the “less is better” postulate applies to the other goals, 
and therefore the unwanted deviation variable is the positive one (i.e.  k p ). 
Following GP logic, the unwanted deviation variables must be minimized in one 







() 1234567 Min n p p n p p p ,,,,,, .        ( 1 8 )  
Several types of achievement functions will be defined and preferentially 
interpreted. Before doing this, though, let us set sensible target values for the seven 
goals considered. These tentative figures, expressed in percentages, are  
t1 = 2, t2  = 4,  t3  = 23,  t4  = -3.5,  t5  = 0,  t6  = 0,  t7  = 0.     
The above vector of satisficing targets means that the policy maker would 
consider the same emissions value as in the benchmark situation (neither decreasing nor 
increasing), together with a real growth rate of 2%, inflation rate of 4%, unemployment 
rate of 23% and a public deficit of 3.5 % over the GDP, to be a reasonable achievement.
  To find a policy that is consistent with these target levels we test several 
functional forms for the general achievement function given by (18). The first one is a 
weighted sum of the unwanted deviation variables, which leads to the following 
weighted GP (WGP) formulation (Ignizio, 1976): 
11 2 2 3 3 44 5 5 6 6 7 7 MinWn W p W p W n W p W p W p ++++++,   (19) 
where  k W  is the weight or relative importance attached by the policy maker to the 
achievement of the k th goal ( 1 7 k, , =   ). The minimization of (19) is subject to all the 
equations defined in the model, as well as the goals defined in (17). Suppose that the 
policy maker is equally concerned about the achievement of all the goals, making the 
weights  12 7 1 WW W == == … . Based on this assumption and the above target values, 
we get the solution shown in Table 2. 
Note that all the target values are defined in percentages. Hence, it is not 







hand, a well-known critical issue in goal programming (see Romero 1991) is the 
possibility of getting a Pareto inefficient solution. A solution is said to be inefficient if 
the value of some criteria can be improved without worsening the value of any other 
criterion. We find that the solution in Table 2 fully satisfies the specified target values 
and, in some cases, the obtained value is even better than the target value. This seems to 
indicate that the target values have been set at very soft levels. This is a typical situation 
in which inefficient solutions may arise and leads us to suspect that the solution shown 
in Table 2 may perhaps be inefficient (Tamiz and Jones, 1996). 
  To check the efficiency of the solution we run a test introduced by Masud and 
Hwang (1980). We proceed by maximizing the wanted deviation variables subject to the 
condition that the achievement of the seven policy goals derived from the WGP model 
cannot be degraded. Thus, the following optimization problem is formulated:   
123 4567 Max p n n p n n n + +++++,        ( 2 0 )  
subject to  1 26 3 f . ≥ ,  2 4 f ≤ ,  3 23 f ≤ ,  4 33 f . ≥− ,  5 04 6 f . ≤ − ,  6 05 5 f . ≤ − ,  7 04 8 f . ≤−  
and all the equations in the model. The resulting solution is shown in Table 3. 
  Firstly, observe that the new solution Pareto dominates the previous one. This 
proves that the solution in Table 2 is inefficient. Also, by construction, we know that the 
solution in Table 3 is Pareto efficient. Secondly, note that, when moving from the first 
to the second solution, the results of all the economic objectives are unchanged, and the 
value of all the environmental objectives improve in the sense that the emissions of all 
the polluting substances decrease. This change can be interpreted as a rearrangement of 
economic activity to benefit the environment. Although efficiency is a typical economic 







considered, an increase in efficiency does not necessarily improve the economic results 
and may be beneficial to the environment. 
  An alternative way to get efficient solutions is to set more demanding target 
values for the different criteria. Thus, let us assume that the policy maker sets the target 
values 
t1 = 2.7, t2  = 3,  t3  = 22.7.  t4  = -3.0,  t5  = -1,  t6  = -2,  t7  = -1.    (21) 
  When solving the problem with these targets, we get the solution that is shown 
in Table 4. Observe that, in this case, all the unwanted deviation variables have 
nonnegative values. This is a sufficient condition for the solution to be efficient. The 
argument is as follows: if solution S  is inefficient, it must be possible to improve the 
value of some objective without worsening any other objective. Suppose, for example, 
that the value of economic growth ( 1 f ) can be improved without worsening the value of 
the other objectives. This means that there is a feasible solution with a smaller value of 
1 n  and the same or a better value for the other unwanted deviation variables. But this 
would render a smaller objective function value in (20), meaning that S  cannot be the 
solution to problem (20). 
  Nevertheless, note that, although the solution in Table 4 is efficient, whereas the 
solution in Table 2 is not, the former does not Pareto dominate the latter, since some 
objectives reach a better value in the first solution and some objectives have a better 
value in the last one.  







  So far, we have used the so-called WGP approach. WGP provides a solution that 
minimizes the weighted sum of unwanted deviations. Nevertheless, this approach does 
not prevent the solution from providing very unsatisfactory results for some of the 
above goals. For example, in the solution shown in Table 4, the target value for the CO2 
emissions is exactly reached. This can be seen as a very satisfactory outcome. But there 
is an 85% deviation from the target value for unemployment, which is likely to be 
unacceptable from an economic point of view.   
  In this section we focus on those cases in which the policy maker is interested in 
getting balanced solutions in the sense that none of the goals deviates too far from the 
targets, i.e. we look for policies that assure that in no case is criteria achievement much 
displaced from the target values. This can be expressed in mathematical terms by the 
minimization of the maximum (weighted) deviation, i.e. 
{ } 11 2 2 3 3 44 5 5 6 6 7 7 Min Max Wn W p W p W n W p W p W p ,,,,,, .   (22) 
  Since this objective function is not smooth, its minimization could be 
computationally complicated. A better way to express this is by the following 
MINMAX GP formulation (Tamiz et al., 1998): 
11 2 2 3 3 44
55 66 77
Min D
st Wn D W p D W p D Wn D
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,   (23) 
plus all the defined equations and goals, D being the maximum deviation. 
  By solving this problem for the target values defined in (21), we get the solution 
shown in Table 5. By comparison with the solution in Table 4, observe that the 







third and the sixth goals, whereas the maximum deviation in Table 4 is 0.85 
corresponding to fourth goal. 
4.4 Establishing a hierarchy for the policy goals  
  In some cases, although policy makers have multiple objectives, they are not 
evenly concerned about all of them. They may have pre-emptive priorities in the sense 
that there is a hierarchy defined over the targets such that the achievement of goals at a 
higher priority level is incommensurably more important than the attainment of lower 
priority objectives. 
  Suppose, for example that the policy maker’s targets can be ranked as follows: 
the first priority includes the environmental targets 5, 6, 7, the second priority level 
includes target 4 and the third includes targets 1, 2 and 3. The achievement function can 
be written as 
() ( ) ( ) 55 66 77 4 1 1 22 33 Lex Min W p W p W p n Wn W p W p ,, ⎡⎤ ++ ++ ⎣⎦ . 
 Also, suppose that the aspiration levels are  
t1 = 2.7, t2  = 4.5,  t3  = 22.7.  t4  = -3.0,  t5  = -1.5,  t6  = -1.5,  t7  = -1.5.     (24) 
  This means that the government’s highest priority is at least a 1.5 % decrease in 
CO2 emissions, SOX emissions and NOX emissions with respect to the benchmark 
situation, while all the pollutants are considered as equally important (since they are 
grouped in the same priority level). The second priority is that the public deficit should 
be no more than 3 % over GDP. Finally, the government is equally concerned about the 







   This kind of lexicographic problem can be solved by resorting to a sequential 
approach. The idea is to solve a sequence of weighted goal programming problems 
corresponding to the different priority levels (Ignizio and Perlis, 1979). 
  In our case, the first level groups goals 5, 6 and 7. Therefore, we need to first 
solve the following problem 
( ) 55 66 77 Min W p W p W p ++ ,      ( 2 5 )  
subject to the goal definitions (for goals 5, 6 and 7 only) and all the equations in the 
model, assuming that  567 1 WWW === . The values achieved by the three goals are  
5 11 8 f . =− ,  6 15 6 f . =− ,  7 10 6 f . =− , and the unwanted deviation variables in this 
exercise are equal to  5 03 2 p . = ,  6 0 p = ,  7 04 4 p = . , meaning that the target value for 
SOX emissions is exactly achieved (actually, emissions can be even further reduced), 
whereas the targets for CO2 emissions and NOX emissions cannot be fully achieved. 
  The second problem of the sequence consists in minimizing the unwanted 
deviation variable for the goals placed in the second priority level, which, in this case, 
includes just the fourth goal. The problem to be solved is 
4
56 7 0 3 200 4 4
Min n
st p p p ≤= ≤ .. . , , . ,
     ( 2 6 )  
including the definition of goals 4, 5, 6 and 7, as well as all the equations in the model. 
The value for the public budget balance (in terms of GDP) is 4 31 4 f . = − , making the 







  The third problem to be solved involves minimizing the weighted sum of the 
unwanted deviation variables corresponding to the goals placed in the third priority 
level. Thus, we have 
11 2 2 3 3
56 7 4 03 2 0 04 4 01 4
MinWn W p W p
st p p p n .. . , , . , .
+ +
≤= ≤≤
 .    (27) 
  For equal weights (i.e.,  123 1 WWW = == ), model (27) reproduces the solution 
provided by model (26). This result is due to the fact that problem (26) has no 
alternative optimum solutions, and consequently the goals placed in the third priority 
level become redundant, i.e., in practice, they play no real role in the decision-making 
process (Amador and Romero, 1989). 
The solution for the third priority level and for the whole lexicographic process 
is shown in Table 6. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper proposes a methodology for designing joint macroeconomic and 
environmental policies. The methodology is based upon a Simonian satisficing 
philosophy and is implemented with the help of different goal programming models. 
The methodology seems sound from both a positive and a normative perspective. 
From a positive perspective, the methodology is supported by conventional 
economic theory (as regards the CGE model) and a satisficing logic, where instead of 
maximizing a problematic welfare function, the policy maker sets tentative targets for 







From a normative perspective, the multi-criteria philosophy underlying the 
approach is consistent with the claim that policy makers should take the view that the 
environment is a key concern, and that environmental criteria are no less important than 
the economic ones. In this way, the proposed methodology provides policies that 
represent sound compromises among the economic and the environmental criteria. 
Our results illustrate how, a priori, the government can set different target 
values for the key criteria and fine-tune its policy accordingly. It was demonstrated 
throughout the paper how GP models, which are very easy to formulate and to compute, 
can output different policies. These policies aggregate the environmental and the 
economic goals in different ways: maximum aggregate performance, maximum balance 
and a lexicographic hierarchy of the goals. On the other hand, a posteriori, by using GP 
models, it is possible to check if the target levels initially fixed by the government for 
each policy criterion are reasonable (i.e., feasible) and what is the trade-off of these 
targets in terms of the other criteria.  
Concerning future research, the proposed approach can be extended in some 
directions. First, the weights attached to the achievement of each goal can be obtained 
using different preference elicitation techniques. Second, different GP formulations can 
be tested. Thus, an Extended GP formulation, which combines the WGP option 
(maximum aggregate performance) and the MINMAX GP option (maximum balance),  
is an interesting possibility, since this would specify the trade-off between aggregate 
achievement and maximum balance among the goals (see Romero, 2001).  Finally, the 
economic model used for the application can be extended and improved in many ways 







can be given more attention, or the dynamics of the economy could be addressed in a 
more sophisticated model. 
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Table 1: Payoff matrix  
  Growth Inflation Unempl. PB/GDP CO2 SOX NOX 
Growth  3.025  3.824 22.460  -3.857 0.408 0.3851 0.3833 
Inflation  2.421  2.311  23.290 -3.489 -0.120 -0.178 -0.151 
Unempl.  3.025 3.824 22.460  -3.857 0.408 0.3851 0.3833 
PB/GDP  2.412 5.601 23.290  -2.984  -1.068 -1.448 -0.056 
CO2  2.470 5.810 23.200  -3.353  -1.162  -1.517 -1.031 
SOX  2.438 5.056 23.240  -3.111  -1.180  -1.5648  -1.059 
NOX  2.413 4.849 23.280  -3.089  -1.172  -1.534  -1.063 
All variables are measured in % with respect to benchmark situation. Bold figures 









  TABLE 2. Finding a satisficing solution 
 k fk n k p k 
1  2.63    0.00  0.63 
2 4.00  0.00  0.00 





















4  -3.30    0.00  0.20   
5  -0.46    0.46    0.00 


























7  -0.48    0.48    0.00 









  TABLE 3. Testing for efficiency 
 k fk n k p k 
1  2.63    0.00  0.63 
2 4.00  0.00  0.00 






















4  -3.30    0.00  0.20   
5  -0.55    0.55    0.00 


























7  -0.50    0.50    0.00 









  TABLE 4. An alternative efficient solution 
 k fk n k p k 
1  2.22    0.48  0.00 
2 4.00  0.00  0.55 






















4  -3.03    0.03  0.00   
5  -1.00    0.00    0.00 


























7  -0.93    0.00    0.07 










  TABLE 5. A balanced solution 
 k fk n k p k 
1  2.33    0.51  0.00 
2 3.70  0.00  0.70 






















4  -3.04    0.04  0.00   
5  -1.00    0.00    0.00 


























7  -0.91    0.00    0.09 





















  TABLE 6. Solution with a hierarchy for policy goals 
 K fk n k p k 
1  2.47    0.23  0.00 
2 5.21  0.00  0.71 






















4  -3.14    0.14  0.00   
5  -1.18    0.00    0.32 


























7  -1.06    0.00    0.44 













Total production is given by the Cobb-Douglas technology 








= ,       ( A 1 )  
where  Qj is the total output of sector j, Xdj stands for the domestic output of sector j, 
Xrowj stands for foreign output of sector j, φj is the scale parameter of sector j and σj (1- 
σj) is the elasticity of domestic (foreign) output. 



























,    (A2) 
where  Xij is the amount of commodity i used to produce commodity j, a ij are the 
technical coefficients measuring the minimum amount of commodity i required to get a 
unit of commodity j, VAj stands for the value added of sector j and vj is the technical 
coefficient measuring the minimum amount of value added required to produce a unit of 
commodity j. 
Value added in sector j is obtained from labor and capital according to a Cobb-Douglas 
technology 
j j











where µj is the scale parameter of sector j, γj is the elasticity of labor, Lj represents the 
amount of labor employed in sector j and Kj represents the amount of capital used in 
sector j. 
CONSUMERS 











⎝⎠ ∏ ,      ( A 4 )  
where CDj stands for consumption of commodity j, SD stands for consumer savings and 
αj , β measure the elasticity of consumer goods and savings. 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
Indirect taxes 
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⎣⎦ ∑∑ ,    (A5) 
where lj and kj are the technical coefficients of capital and labor in sector j, τj is the tax 
rate on the output of sector j and ECj is the Social Security tax rate paid by employees 
of sector j. 
Social Security paid by employers, RLF, is given by 
9
1
LF j j j
j
R EC wl VA
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=∑ .       ( A 6 )  
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=∑ ,      ( A 7 )  
where tj is the tax rate on all the transactions made with foreign sector j, arwj represents 
technical coefficients of commodities imported by sector j and rowp is a weighted price 
index of imported good and services. 
Rm  stands for the revenue obtained from the environmental tax on pollutant m, 
( { } 2,, XX mC O N O S O ∈ ), and it is given by  
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,    (A.8)                             
where 
mm m
jj t β= ⋅ α is the environmental tax rate for pollutant m  on sector j, 
expressed in terms of euro paid per euro produced. 
The value added tax revenue, RVAT, is given by 
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where VATj is the tax rate ad valorem on (domestic and foreign) commodity j. 
Direct taxes 
Social Security tax paid by employers, RLC , is obtained from 







where WC is the employers’ Social Security tax rate. 
Income tax, RI, is computed from 
( ) w L WC TROW TPS   cpi rK wL DT RI − + + + =    (A.11) 
where DT is the income tax rate, TPS stands for transfers from the public sector to the 
consumer (pensions, allowances, social benefits, unemployment benefits…) and TROW 
stands for transfers from the rest of the world to the consumer. 